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IS IT THE MINOR'S RIGHT:
THE MINOR'S ABORTION DECISION IN VIRGINIA
J. Thompson Cravens·

Brian Fowler·

The Abortion Right

In the 1973 landmark decision of Roe v. Wadel,

the united

states Supreme Court upheld the fundamental constitutional right
of women to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.
Since
state

that time
level] to

"there has been a political backlash [at the
limit and destroy that right.,,2
In Virginia,

1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Note, Restrictions on the Abortion Rights of Minors, 3 Harvard
Womens law Journal, 119 (1980). The case law denotes the backlash to the
abortion decision in Roe v. Wade as well. Note: Planned Parenthood of
central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), (court invalidated
portions of a Missouri statute which inposed spousal and parental consent
requirements). Beal v. D:le and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), (companion cases on the question of medicaid funding of abortions). Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), (court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts
statute requiring parental consent and absolute veto power over the
abortion decision of a minor child). H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S.ct. 1164
(1981), (state statute requiring physician to notify minor's parents before
performing an abortion on their minor child held constitutional). city of
Akron v. Akron center for Reproductive Health. Inc .. et aI, 462 U.S. 416
(1983), (local ordinance requiring all abortions performed after first
trimester to be performed in a hospital held unconstitutional, the section
declaring all minors under age of 15 incapable of making an abortion
decision as a mature person and providing t.hp.t abortion is only in minor's
best interest when parents' consent held unconstitutional, section requiring a waiting period of 24 hours held unconstitutional). Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), (Missouri statute requiring
all abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be performed in a hospital
held unconstitutional because it "unreasonably infringes on a woman's
constitutional right to obtain an abortion." J. Powell at 476.). simoPOulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, (1983), (court upheld a Virginia abortion
statute requiring all second trimester abortions to be performed in

2

attempts to regulate abortions have focused on minors and their
procreation
regulate

decisions.

minor~'

Generally,

states

have

attempted

to

procreation decisions by restricting physicians

from performing abortions on minors without parental consent or
notification.

Though unsuccessful in virginia,

parental consent

bills have been proposed in the Virginia Assembly
1985 and the 1986 sessions. 3
Currently

in

Virginia

a

pregnant

minor

in both the

may

go

to

any

abortion clinic in the state and receive an abortion if she is
still in the first trimester of her pregnancy and has the money
to pay for the procedure.

The minor is not required to have an

adult present nor is she required to notify her parents or obtain
their consent.

Some clinics

impose

age· restr i ctions

and will

accept young women under the age of 14 only if .lccompanied by a
parent

or

legal

guardian.

Minors

in

the

second

trimester of

pregnancy may also receive an abortion; but the procedure must be
performed in a licensed hospital. 4 The hospital is not required
to

be

a

"general-acute

care

facility",

a

licensed

outpatient

clinic falls under the term hospital as provided by statute.
recently

proposed

legislation would

either:

1)

the

have

consent

of

force

a

The

pregnant minor to

one of her

parents

or legal

guardians for an abortion br 2) make application to the juvenile
and domestic relations district court for that court to determine
whether

or

not

to

authorize

an

abortion

for

the

minor.

The

decision would be based upon a showing by the minor that she is

licensed outpatient clinics because it was not an unreasonable infringement, unlike Akron and Ashcroft where abortions were required to be
performed in "general, acute-care facilities.").
3 1985 Session, House Bill m.Dl1ber 1364 "requirements for abortions for
minors," proposed by Delegate Morrison, Pass€d House of Delegates. senate
Cormnittee for Courts of Justice amended 1364. The House rejected the
amendment by the Senate.
1986 Session, Senate Bill number 342 proposed by Senator Goode, killed
in Senate Cormnittee on Education and Health.
4 See Simopoulos v. Virginia, supra at note 2.
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"sufficiently mature and well informed,,5 or that the abortion is
in the "best interest,,6 of the minor.
History of Children's Rights
At common law, minors had only limited personal rights other
than general rights to receive minimal parental or state care. 7
Today, "[w]hile a child is not beyond constitutional protection
simply because of minority, the court has traditionally acknowledged three reasons why the rights of minors cannot be equalled
with those of adults:
first, [it has recognized] the 'peculiar
vulnerability' of children.
Second, the court has limited
freedom in those areas where children may be unable to make
critical decisions in an informed manner.
Third, the court .•.
[has recognized] the parental role in child rearing,
and
found parental influence and authority over the child [to be]
preferable to that of the state. ,,8
Historically minors were
required to obtain parental consent for medical treatment 9 as it
was presumed that a minor could not give such consent 10 because
of his lack of "experience, knowledge, and maturity."ll "Today
this legal concept is reflected in many restrictions of minors'
5 1986 Senate Bill Number 342 at 3.
6 Ibid.

7 supra note 2, 3 Harvard Womens law Journal, at 122.
8 Note, Statute requiring parental consent fOlmd to tmconstitutionally
burden right to abortion, Bellotti v. Baird, 18 Journal of Family law 403,
at 405.
9 see generally Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical care, 36 AlB. L.
Rev. 462 (1972).

10 see: Pilpel, supra note 8, Note, Sexual Privacy: A=ess of a Minor
COntraception, Abortion and sterilization Without Parental COnsent, 12
U. Richmond L. Rev. 221 (1977), Note, Minor's Rights of Privacy: Limitations on state Action After Danforth and carey, 77 COlum. L. Rev. 1216,
1222 nn. 41 and 42.

to

11 Note, '!he Minor's Right to COnsent to Abortion:
Oklahoma From Akron? 37 Okla. L. Rev. 780, 786 (1984).
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How Far is

rights that further the significant state interest 12 of compensating

for

contract,

a

minor's

vote,

incapacity.,,13

Minors

a-re

not

or work- when and where they please.

free

to

states and

the federal government have imposed regulations to protect minors
in

the

workplace.

legally present

in
regard to minors. 15

The

freedoms

guaranteed to all who are
the United states 14 may be restricted with

The court in In re Gault 16 extended to minors the guarantees
of

procedural

due

process. 17

desegregation,

the

Court assumed that a

In

other

areas

such

as

school

child's constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws was the same as adults. 18

Gault was a significant doctrinal advance because of the focus of
the

decision

on

the

constitutionality

of

differing

procedural

12 Note, Parental Notice statutes: Permisible state Regulation of
Minor's Abortion Decision, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 81, 96 (1980), citing
(Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979) (Bellotti II); ~
v. carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
13 Ibid.
citing generally, PlaJUled Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52,102 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring in part arx:1 dissenting in
part); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968)
(Stewart, J.,
COl1O.lITing); J. calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts
8-1, 8-4,
at 230, 235 (2d ed. 1977); W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts
18,
134, at 102, 996-99 (4th ed. 1971) Note, Parent, Child, arx:1 the Decision to
Abort: A critique of the Suprema Court's statutory Proposal in Bellotti
v. Baird, 52 S. cal. L. Rev. 1869, at 1871-72 (1979).
14 See Bridges v. Wixon 326 U.S. 135 (1945), (all persons legally
within the borders of the United states are subject to the guarantees of
the Constitution).
15 See generally PlaJUled Parenthood v. Danforth, and Ginsberg v. New
York, supra, note 12.
16 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17 Foye, supra note 11, at 97.
18 Note, The SUprema Court arx:1 a Minor's Abortion Decision, 80
Colum. L. Rev. 1251, 1253 (1980), (citing at n. 9 Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 490-92 (1954}).
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standards accorded adults and juveniles. 19 The court has also
emphasized that "[a] minor's first amendment rights may be
abridged or limited in ways not permissible if the rights of
adults were involved.,,20 The argument that constitutional rights
may not be restricted solely because of age based restrictions is
flawed however.
"The Constitution itself recognized attainment
of a certain age as a prerequisite to the exercise of some
rights. 1121
The state has traditionally been granted great latitude in
the regulation of minors' conduct. The question of when a state
may permissibly restrict a minor's right to an abortion was not
completely answered by the resolution of the parental consent
issues in the Danforth~ and Bellotti 23 cases. 24 In H.L. v. Matheson,25 the court's holding concerning the constitutionality of
a Utah statute that required parental notification by a physician
prior to performing an abortion on a minor was limited to
dependent, unemancipated minors who failed to make a showing of
19 Id. at 1253.
20 49 Fordham L. Rev., supra note 11, at 98. see n. 83 =nparing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-40, 645 (1968) (cannot sell to
minors certain obscene materials which can be sold to adults) with Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969)
(minors first amerx:lment right to wear black annbands to protest Vietnam war
cannot be arbitrarily abridged). The Tinker court emphsized that minor's
first amerrlment rights may not be arbitrarily restricted. Id. at 505-507.
21 Ibid., citing at n. 82, U.S. Const. Art. I 2, cl. 2 (age of
be a member of House of Representatives); U.S. Const. art. I
3,
1, cl .. 5 (age of 35
(age of 30 to be Senator); U.S. Const. Art. II,
President); see U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, 1 (right to vote afforded
18 or older) •
22 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
23 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
24 Okla. L. Rev"

supra note 10, at 796.

25 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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25 to
c1. 3
to be
those

maturity. 26 Obviously, determining the constitutionality of the
proposed Virginia abortion consent legislation would be speculative.
The Court has, however, enumerated several requirements
that statutes must meet to be deemed constitutional. This paper
will apply those standards to the proposed legislation and
determine whether or not the proposed statutes fulfill the
enumerated requirements.
Why Parental Consent?
statutes requiring parental consent for a minor's abortion
have been justified on several grounds.
The Supreme Court has
recognized that a state can restrict a minor's constitutional
rights because of the minor's vulnerability, the minor's inability to make an informed decision, and the countervailing interests of the minor's parents. 27 In Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, the court held that no state had the
constitutional authority to give parents or any third party an
absolute veto power over the decision of a doctor and the minor
to terminate the minor's pregnancy.28
However, the court also
stated that the holding "does not suggest that every minor,
regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for
termination of her pregnancy.n29
As noted before, in Bellotti III the Court found unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that required parental or judicial
consent before an unmarried minor could have an abortion.
The
statute was struck down because it failed to allow mature minors
to have an abortion without parental consent and it did not
provide the minor with an opportunity to obtain a jUdicial
determination that she was mature enough to consent to an
26 Id. at 407.
27 Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622, 634.
28 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
29 Id. at 75.
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abortion or that, while not mature, the abortion would be in her
best interest. 30
Recognizing the significant state interest in
supporting the role of parents in child-rearing, however, the
court stated that parental consent is a qualification that
typically may be imposed on a minor's right to make important
decisions. 31 The Court explained
"as immature minors often lack the ability to make
fully informed choices that take account of both
immediate and long-range consequences, a state reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is
desirable and in the best interest of the minor.
It
may
further determine that such consultation
is
particularly desirable with respect to the abortion
decision ..•. There can be little doubt that the state
furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and
advice of her parents in making the very important
decision whether or not to bear a child. n32
A young girl seeking an abortion is under a great amount of
emotional stress.
Frightened and confused she may be ill-equipped to make her decision without mature advice and support. 33
The court has expressed concern that if that advice does not corne
from her parents, the minor may not get it elsewhere. Abortion
clinics would not likely provide adequate counsel since a
decision not to abort would be contrary to their financial
interest. 34
The Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed the significant
state interest in protecting parental authority over the rearing
of children. 35
This relationship between parent and child is
30 Bellotti, at 651.
31 Id. at 640.
31 Id. at 640-641.
33 Id. at 641.
34 49 Fordham L. Rev. 100, supra at note 11, at n. 96.
35 Matheson at 410.
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constitutionally protected. 36
In Matheson, the court restated
that parents have an important guiding role to play in the
upbringing of their children and that this includes counseling
them on important decisions. 37
Parental consent and notice statutes also serve a significant state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to
supply essential medical and other information to a physician. 38
The decision to have an abortion, especially when the patient is
immature, can have lasting medical, emotional and psychological
consequences. 39
Parents can provide medical and psychological
data that may be important to the physician. Parents may also be
able to refer the physician to other sources of relevant data,
such as a family physician. 40
The recent Supreme Court decisions on the abortion issue
show that constitutional justification for parental consent
statutes is not lacking.
They serve important state interests.
The important issue to be considered is 9rocedurally, how does a
state preserve the minor's right and simoultaneously protect her
interest when they may conflict.
Judicial consent
It is clear from the decision of the Court in Bellotti that
a state may require parental consent if it also provides a
judicial or administrative procedure that the minor could use
without first notifying her parents. 41 The court stated, "[w]e
conclude ..• that every minor must have the opportunity - if she so
36 Id. at 410.
37 Id. at 410.
38 Id. at 411.
39 Id. at 41l.
40 Id. at 411.
41 Bellotti v. Baird, at 647.
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desires - to go directly to a court without first consulting or
notifying her parents .,,42
Justice Stevens, however, questioned
the

Powell

model. 43

There

is

a

strong

argument

that

II

[t] he

burden of initiating judicial proceedings would raise formidable
obstacles to the exercise of abortion rights by minors, who
generally are among those with 'little access to legal help,."44
This argument may not be as meritorious as it first appears.
Those physicians and clinics that perform abortions are
professional,
and should
be very
familiar
with
judicial
procedures.
They would inform a minor that she must have either
parental or judicial consent before an abortion may be performed.
the

The clinics, for business purposes, would surely keep all of
forms and petitions that would be necessary to commence

judicial

proceedings.

initiate proceedings

Thus,
and

the

obstacle

initiating

those

of

knowing

proceedings

how

to

in fact

could be circumvented or hurdle,d by the cl inics themselves. The
proposed Virginia statutes also provide that the minor or next
friend

shall

Relations

make

Court,

application

and

the

to

the

Juvenile

and

Domestic

clerk,

on request, will assist in
preparing the petition and notices. 45
It may therefore be the
case that a judicial proceeding is not in fact an unconstitutional burden on the child bearing minor.
There are however more compelling arguments that a judicial
proceeding is a formidable obstacle unconstitutionally impeding
the
the

~ight

of minors to abort.

recollection

abortion

decision

that

" ... a

without

We must view these obstacles with
regulation

unduly

which

burdening

impinges
it

will

on the
survive

42 Ibid.
43 (stevens, J. concurring at 656 n. 4).
44 Note, The Supreme COurt and the Minor's Abortion Decision, 80
COlurn. L. Rev. 1251, 1261 (1980) (citing at n. 58; FUentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 83 n. 13 (1972). See also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828
(2nd Cir. 1977) (noting "the burden of initiating judicial review")).
45 Senate Bill Number 342, at 3.
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constitutional attack if it reasonably furthers a proper state
purpose.,,46
Many commentators rtote the
procedures.

impor~ance

of timing in abortion

It is quite possible that a delay in the abortion

process to allow for a judicial determination could potentially
deny a minor her constitutional right to abort during the
appropriate trimester.
The proposed Virginia statute however
requires a hearing on the merits " ... as soon as possible but no
later than five days after the filing of the petition.,,47
Further, the proposed legislation requires that the Court render
a decree " ... within forty-eight hours of the hearing.,,48
This statute thus grants the Court a total of seven days to
dispense of a minor's petition for an abortion.
Though this may
be a burden on the minor's right to abort, it appears to be a
permissable

burden.

The

Court

in

Bellotti

by

requiring

a

jUdicial alternative surely envisioned that this alternative
would require at least some delay in t.he abortion process.
The
Virginia proposal

strictly specifies that the Court shall hear

the petition and render a decree - "as expeditiously as possible,,49 and further places an absolute time limitation on the
court.
It thus strictly denotes that time is a critical factor
in the abortion process and speaks to limit the burden placed on
the minor by the judicial determination.
For these reasons, it
appears that the proposed statute does not create an impermis-

46 Note, state statute requiring both parental consent and court order
for urnnarried minors seeking abortions and spousal notification and
consultation for married women seeking abortions held unconstitutional, 19
Journal of Family law 149, 151 (1980). Note cites Scheinberg v. Smith,
482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
47 Senate Bill Number 342, at 3.
48 Id; at 4.
49 Id. at 3,4.
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sable delay in the abortion process. 50
The proposed statute conforms to Justice Powell's suggested
model of a judicial alternative set forth in Bellotti. 51
It
specifically states what three decisions the court may reach.
The court may find that the minor is mature and "grant majority
rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion,,52, or the
court may find that an abortion is in the "best interest,,53 of
the minor and give judicial consent for the abortion. The court
may also deny the petition, but the statute requires that the
Court set forth the grounds for the denial. 54
It has been suggested that there is no basis for assuming
the improvidence of a minor, and that without that assumption
there is inadequate constitutional justification for imposing
upon her the burden of proving her entitlement to the exercise of
a constitutional right. 55
However, as has previously been
discussed in this article, the law has traditionally limited the
scope of minors' rights on the presumption of their incapacity.
50 See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1535 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois
parental consent statute providing district judicial consent alternative to
minor upheld. Time requirements inherent in process not deemed unconstitutional burden on minors rights. Section of act imposing a twenty-four hour
waiting period held unconstitutional and severable from act) Act cited at
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D. Illinois, E.D. 1984).
51 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), at 643-647.
52 Senate Bill number 342 at 4.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1251, supra at note 43, at 1262, citing at n. 60
(Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 - 26 (1958) (unconstitutional
obstruction of a fundamental right though the state's .allocation of the
burden of proof in litigation regarding the right); cf. Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (determination of standard of proof on basis of
iITportance of the interests of the litigants affected by the judgment).
Compare Shuttlesworth v; Birmimham, 394 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1969), with
Niemohko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276-86 (1951) (Frankfurther, J.,
concurring) (constitutionality of administrative denials of permission to
exercise constitutional rights)).
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The fact that the Court has placed the burden on a minor to prove
either that she is mature or that an abortion is in her best
This ruling reflects the
interest is adequately justified.
traditional notion that during the formative years, "minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgement to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."56 If the state
may constitutionally restrict this right, and the minor falls in
the category of restricted persons,

it is proper that she bear

the burden of showing why this constitutional restriction should
not apply.
The proposed Virginia statutes appear to be constitutional.
Their purpose is to protect the states' interest in the parent,
the minor, the fetus, and the family.
The states' interests are
served when a minor's best interests are protected, and her
heal th is not placed in jeopardy.
"[T]he state has a parens
patriae interest
nors."57

in

preventing

improvident

decisions

by

mi-

Recent Development
On June 11, 1986, the United states Supreme Court in a 5-4
vote decided Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians. 58
At issue in the case was the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of
1982.
dures

This act attempted to strictly re<;Julate abortion procein

the

state

and was

legislation was overbroad,
interest,
intimately

it

it did not serve a

constituted an

personal

held unconstitutional

abortion

invasion
decision,

into
and

the
it

because the

legitimate state
privacy of
had

an

overall

"chilling effect" on the exercise of a constitutional right.
56 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
57 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428U.S. 52,73,75 (1976).
58 Thornburgh
v. American
College
495
(U.S. June 11,
1986)
(available
Genfed library, U.S. file).
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of
June

the

Obstetricians,
No. 8415, 1986, on lEXIS,

The

Court cited its previous decisions in Ashcroft 59 , Simopoulos 60 ,
Roe v. Wade 61 , Danforth 62 , and Akron 63 ; and it relied on the
precedents established ih these decisions to declare the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act unconstitutional.
The court in Thornburgh clarified its earlier decisions. It
announced that state ordinances that "raised a ~pectre of public
exposure and harrassment of women who choose to exercise their
personal, intensely private, right, ... "64 would not be tolerated.
The Court further ruled that no statute may require a
physician to make a

" ... 'trade-off' between the woman's health

and fetal survival, and [all abortion control statutes must)
require that maternal health be the physician's paramount
consideration. "65
The crux of the decision lay in the dicta of the opinion.
The court emphatically spoke to the question of whether abortion
was a freedom guaranteed by the Constitution.
It noted that
those rights publicly afforded to women by the Roe v. Wade
decision, though morally objectionable to some, were within the
"certain private sphere of individual liberties that will be kept
largely beyond the reach of government."66 Therefore, though the
court did not attempt to invalidate all state restrictions
concerning the abortion rights of women and minors, it plainly
and with unmistakable language informed states that they must
guarantee and
59

See

p~otect

these freedoms women enjoy.

supra note 2.

60 See supra note 2.
61 See supra note 1.
62

See

supra note 2.

63

See

supra note 2.

64 See supra note 58, slip op. at 16-18.
65 See supra note 58, slip op. at 18-22.
66 See supra note 58, slip op. at 25, (emphasis added) .
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Any regulation

imposed on women that restricts their access or the desirability
of

having

an

abortion

must

rationally

and

legitimately

serve

proper state goals.
conclusion
The proposed Virginia legislation provides every alternative
that the court requires, and includes no provision previously
invalidated.
The legislation denotes the unique nature and the
special medical problems of pregnancy and abortion. The proposed
statutes would not apply where a medical emergency exists that
complicates the pregnancy and threatens the life of the mother to
the extent that in the physician's best medical judgement an
abortion is warranted. 67
The statute also does not allow a
judicial veto. of an abortion decision of a minor after the minor
has been declared mature and capable of consent. 68 It therefore
appears that the
current case law.

proposed

legislation

is

constitutional

under

This work however discusses solely the legal ramifications
of abortion consent statutes.
The moral, ethical, and practical
considerations of children bearing children are problems of much
greater magnitude.
Abortion rights are hotly debated in our
society today, and it appears that the current membership of the
United states Supreme Court affirm that right. Women's activists
fear that state restriction of the abortion right will lead to a
return to the days of "back alley abortion clinics" which brought
horror and destruction to the lives of innocent young women.
These are the moral,
Virginians
This

in

policy

the

political,

and ethical questions that face

consideration

decision

by

the

of

proposed

General

consent statutes.

Assembly

will

determine

whether or not a consent statute becomes law in Virginia.

67 Senate bill number 342, at 4.
68 Ibid.
See also Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, at 1001
(D. Mass. 1978) (Bellotti III) (upon a finding of maturity and informed
consent, state is no longer entitled to impose restriction upon the young
woman's decision).
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VIRGINIA'S INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS:
THE NEW COURTS SCOPE AND POWER
D.E. Barney·

The Scope of the Problem:

Appellate Inundation

The increased number of lawsuits brought in state trial
courts in the past quarter century has strained the capacity of
state supreme courts .to hear all valid appeals.
Meritorius
petitions for appeal meet denial or cursory decisions which fail
to develop important legal doctrine.
As a result, many states
have enacted legislation creating intermediate appellate courts
to reduce the burden on the state supreme court in order that
that tribunal might fulfill its obligation to settle developing
areas of law. In general, the intermediate courts in the various
states hear appeals that turn on reversible error in the trial
judgment.
Harder questions of constitutional, statutory, and
cornmon law interpretation pass to the state supreme court for
hearing. Weisberger, pp. 239-240.
The Virginia Legislature created the Court of Appeals,
effective January 1, 1985, in response to a fourfold increase in
the number of petitions to the Supreme Court during the past two
decades. Brissette, p. 209.
Some controversy surrounded the
reformation of the appeals process, including practitioners'
concerns over the increased costs of more frequent and dual
appeals.
Some fear existed that important cases worthy of
consideration by the Supreme Court might meet final judgment in
the lower court.
Scalia and Lilly, pp. 56-60.
The statutory
scheme promulgated by the Legislature finesses these difficulties
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by granting the Court of Appeals broad jurisdiction and power of
finality while reserving to the Supreme Court discretionary
review of all Court of Appeals decisions.
Va. Code Sect.
At this early date in the Court of Appeals'
17-116.05-.08.
history, the new Court appears ready to manage the flood of
petitions for appeal with minimum disruption of Virginia litigation.
The Court of Appeals' Jurisdiction and Discretionry Review
The Intermediate Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction
in matters of contempt, injunctions, writs of mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus.
The statute grants appellate jurisdiction for appeals from circuit Courts' review of administrative
agency determinations, final decisions of the Industrial Commission of Virginia, and final judgments from the Circuit Courts
concerning all domestic relations cases.
Further, all convictions for crimes or traffic infractions are appealable to the new
court, except where the death penalty arises.
(Death sentences
are appealable directly to. the Virginia Supreme Court.) Va. Code
sect. 17-116.04-.05.1.
These appeals are of right.
Va. Code
Sect. 17-116.05.2.
The statutory scheme provides that the
decision of the Court of Appeals shall be final, without appeal
of right to the Supreme Court in traffic and misdemeanor convictions having no -jail sentence, administrative or Industrial
Commission cases, or domestic relations cases.
Va. Code Sect.17-116.07.
A problem inherent in dividing appellate jurisdiction
between an intermediate court and the supreme court of a state
arises because relative importance of legal issues cannot be
consistently based upon dollar amount or subject matter.
"All
tort cases are not of negligible social importance; nor are all
cases raising constitutional issues of general public concern--if
for no other reason than that the issue is frivolous."
Scalia
and Lilly, pp. 47-50. Any type of case can present a legal issue
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~ .. " ".~
worthy of determination of the state supreme court. Intermediate
court jurisdiction must not preclude discretionary high court
review of sociplly important cases. Judge Scalia and Professor
Lilly suggested in 1971 that two factors be considered in
weighing the "importance" of a case for discretionary review of
the intermediate court's decision.
First, the significance of
the appeal to the entire legal system, such as a case where
limited private interests turn on an unsettled point of state
law, needs to be considered.
Secondly, the importance of the
appeal to the involved parties should affect the high court's
discretionary review.
An appealed death sentence or huge civil
damages award may turn on only a factual distinction, but the
weighty individual interests involved may merit review in the
state's highest court. id. The Virginia Legislature allowed for
certification of appeals to the Supreme Court on motion of the
Court of Appeals or on the motion of the high court itself,
within the Supreme Court's discretion. Va. Code Sect.
17-116.06.
This statutory feature ensures that important cases
meriting high court review are not blocked by an overly deterministic legislative scheme.
Placing final review of all appeals within the discretion of
the virginia supreme Court alleviates the burden on litigants of
repeated appeals as of right.
Resistance to this type of
appellate reform arises from the ranks of trial attorneys as the
spectre of protracted appeals clogs the courts and delays final
decisions.
Allowing a second appeal to the Supreme Court only
when that body determines such review warranted in the particular
situation makes the vast majority of Court of Appeals decisions
final, while assuring that important cases are certified to the
Supreme Court.
This is the model suggested by the American Bar
Association, and followed by the majority of states which have an
intermediate division.
Brissette, p. 224.
This model also
allows appellate development of factual and legal issues in
specific cases before the Supreme Court passes judgment on the
significance of the case. id. at 229. The Florida scheme allows
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parties to petition the intermediate court to bypass that court
and appeal directly to the Florida Supreme Court.
If the
intermediate court determines that the appeal merits high court
review, they grant the bypass petition.
This scheme runs the
risk that legally significant appeals may be herd in the intermediate court by that tribunal, without oversight by the highest
court.
id. at 225.
The Virginia statute ensures that all
petitions will be examined for merit by the Supreme Court, while
maintaining the docket control of channeling through the Intermediate Court of Appeals.
Finally, the statutory scheme enacted in Va. Code Sect. 17116 provides the element of control required by the late expansion of Virginia's judicial process.
The crucial discretionary
oversight of all appeals heard in the Court of Appeals provides a
simple and direct method of certifying legally significant
appeals to the Supreme Court.
The granting of appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals creates an organized management
of an ever-increasing number of appeals of trial jUdgments within
the Commonwealth.
This reformed appellate process ensures
ordered control of a burgeoning docket while vesting final
judgment in what is legally significant in Virginia case law
firmly in the Virginia Supreme Court.
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The author wishes to apologize for the informal nature of
these notes. Production exigencies required that these be presented in this format.

MARITAL RAPE: THE LEGISLATIVE BATTLE
Sherri Davis *

Introduction

Society recognizes rape as one of the most serious violent
crimes,

one

which

physically.
that

state

scars

its

victims

Despite its seriousness,
lawmaking

bodies have

emotionally

as

well

as

it has been only recently

given attention to the wide-

spread crime of marital rape.
Marital rape has the potential to be even more traumatic to
a victim than rape by a stranger.

Indeed, "when you are raped by

a stranger you have to live with a frightening memory.

When you

are raped by your husband, you have to live with your rapist."l
Al though
marital

there

are

few

statistics

reporting

the

incidence

of

rape,

it is believed that 14% of all married women are
victims of this crime. 2 There is no consensus among sociologists
as to why marital rape occurs; however,
statutory marital

it is agreed that state

rape exemptions may contribute to the accep-

tance of this conduct.
Legislatures have been reluctant

to change or abolish the

traditional marital rape exemptions of state law.
1980,

44

recognized

states
the

through
right

of

their marital

rape

a

force

husband

to

As recently as

exemption
his

wife

statutes
to

1 Dr. David Finkelhor in testimony supporting New Hampshire H.B. 516,
eliminating the marital rape exemption to sexual offenses, to the Judiciary
Committee, New Hampshire state Le:)islature (Mar. 25, 1981).
2 D. Russell, Rape in Marriage, 2 (1982); this author received funding
from the National Institute of Mental Health to corrluct a study on the
incidence of marital rape.
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have

sexual relations. In the past six years, however, in response to
both judicial decisions struggling with the implications of
marital rape exemptions and increasing public recognition of the
problem of marital rape, more than 17 states have modified their
rape statutes to allow for prosecution of spousal rape.
Historical Justifications of the Marital Rape Exemption
Marital rape exemptions in this country were adopted from
the English common law exemption,

first articulated in 1736 by

English Chief Justice Matthew Hale in History of the Pleas of
Crown:
:"[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up
herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot
retract....
[I]n marriage she hath given up her body
to her husband ... "3
This matrimonial consent theory was justified by common law
assumptions that upon marriage, a wife became the property of her
husband or that the spouses became one entity.

Legally, then, a

husband could not be guilty of assaulting or raping chattel, or
in the

latter case,

effectively

himself.

invalidated

by

Al though

the

Married

these assumptions were
Women's

Property

Acts

adopted in the 1800's, marital rape exemptions were not contemporaneously abolished.

In addition, proponents began to advance

more practical arguments in support of the marital rape exemption.
The possibility of fabricated complaints is an often cited
reason for retaining the exemption, however, the danger of false
charges is apt to arise in the context of any statutory crime.
3 1 Hale, Pleas of the

crown, 628-29 (1736).
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Furthermore,

the stigma associated with rape discourages marital

rape victims in particular from fabricating complaints.
tioners
problems

favoring

the

associated

exemption
with

also

proving

point

lack

of

to

the

of marital

rape.

Courts

have

evidentiary

consent,

difficulty is inherent to all rape prosecutions,

Practi-

but

this

not just those

similarly dismissed

these

legal

rationales for the marital rape exemption. 4
Defendants of the exemption have also attemtped to justify
it based on the argument that allowing prosecution of husbands
for rape would disrupt or impede reconciliation of troubled marriages.5

As the virginia supreme Court observed,

lilt is hard to

imagine how charging a husband with the violent crime of rape can
be more disruptive to marriages than the violent act itself."6
As commentators have noted,
male

supremacy

advanced

in

in

marriage

support

of

the

and

both the antiquated notion of
the

marital

various
rape

policy

exemption

arguments
cannot

be

accepted in contemporary American society.7

Toward Nationwide Reform
state courts have only recently challenged the arguments for
4 See e.g. People v. Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 515, 121 Misc. 2d 113
(1983) .
5 Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 stan. L. Rev.
719, 725 (1954).
6 Weishaupt v. Virginia, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
7 See e.g. S. Barry, Spousal Rape:
(1980).

The Uncommon Law 66 A.B.A. J. 1088
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retaining the marital rape exemption and state legislatures have
been slower to take the cue. state rape laws presently run the
gamut from barring prosacution of Hvoluntary social companions H
to total abolition of the marital rape exemption.
[See North
Dakota Code XXXXX and New Jersey Code XXXXX.J
A majority of amended statutes allowing prosecution of the
crime of marital rape include requirements of separation or
"living apart" at the time the offense was committed.
[See
Colorado Code XXXXX. J
Some of these states have gone a step
further, and require that one party have made a f il ing for
divorce.
[See Wisc. Stat. Ann. 940.225(6). J
Other states have
combined these requirements and have taken the approach that
prosecution may be had if the parties were living apart or if one
party had filed for divorce when the alleged rape occurred.
The various statutes allowing prosecution of marital rape
also impose time limitations for reporting of the crime by the
victim, and in some cases, require that the complainant prove
serious bodily injury.
[See california Code XXXXX and W. Va.
Code Ann. 61-88-6 (1984).J
Although these statutory requirements are intended· to
circumvent the problems with marital rape prosecutions, they
operate in some cases as severe prosecution limitations and may
also cause interpretation problems for the courts. However, this
progress in modifying the statutory bar to marital rape prosecutions is a step toward the larger goal of ensuring that rape laws
protect a woman's bodily autonomy.
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